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STUDENT WORK
Toward a Constitutional Theory of
Expression: The Copyright Clause, the
First Amendment, and Protection of
Individual Creativity
JACQUELINE SHAPIRO*
The author presents a unique theory of personal expres-
sion under the Constitution, which posits that underlying the
first amendment and the copyright clause is the principle that
the public good requires encouragement, not suppression, of in-
dividual expression. Historically, decisions undermining au-
thors' copyrights in favor of other social goals discouraged the
creativity necessary for cultural development, and Congress
and the courts responded by increasing the protection of au-
thors and expanding the domain of copyrightable works. Simi-
larly, official proscription of commercial and offensive speech
for less than the most urgent social needs threatens to inhibit
the creative spirit protected by the first amendment. The au-
thor urges that the Supreme Court read the first amendment
and the copyright clause as integral parts of a constitutional
philosophy, fostering the framers' goals of greater personal
freedom and informed social decisionmaking.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Communication, the creation and sharing of individual expres-
sion, occupies a central position in our constitutional framework.
While the first amendment forbids Congress to inhibit expression
by speech or press,1 the copyright clause affirmatively grants Con-
gress the power to protect tangible manifestations of individual
communication." Thus, although not permitted to abridge speech,
Congress may encourage the search for ever new forms of
expression.
Most articles on the intersection of copyright 'and the first
amendment have considered the first amendment as a defense to a
copyright infringement action. They discuss how the monopoly af-
forded an individual author through a copyright must be balanced
against the first amendment goals of free speech and the dissemi-
nation of ideas.' This comment proposes a different focus: an ex-
amination of the meaning that the copyright clause, as an integral
part of the Constitution, imparts to the philosophy underlying the
first amendment." By comparing the evolution of the law affecting
1. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
A majority of the United States Supreme Court has never interpreted the first amend-
ment as an absolute ban on governmental regulation of all individual expression. Instead, a
host of judicial methodologies have been premised on a view of the first amendment not as
the result of a prior accommodation, but as the source of a continuous reconciliation, be-
tween its guarantees to the individual and other requirements of society. See, e.g., Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519, 529-36 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (national secur-
ity); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (keeping the peace and preventing interference
with business and social activities).
2. The Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Inherent in the constitutional provision is the distinction between unprotected ideas,
which remain always in the public domain, and their expression in tangible forms, which
renders them eligible for copyright status as "writings." Cf. Hemingway v. Random House,
Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1969) (conversations of the late
novelist held unprotected because of implied waiver of common law copyright). The Hem-
ingway court emphasized that expression should be in tangible form to receive copyright
protection in most situations. It asked but did not answer the question whether unusual
circumstances might justify copyrighting speech itself. See also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99
(1879) (bookkeeping system not subject to copyright); Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.
§ 102; M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.18 (1978).
3. See, e.g., Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and Press? 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180 (1970).
4. The copyright clause merely authorizes Congress to exercise its granted power. The
first amendment, on the other hand, explicitly prohibits the government from abridging in-
dividual rights. Yet this distinction, which concededly indicates a difference in substance as
well as form of rights, compare West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
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individual expression under the copyright clause with that under
the first amendment, a framework for analyzing free speech claims
emerges: Even when balanced with conflicting social interests, the
goals of the Constitution are best served by encouraging, not sup-
pressing, individual expression.
In empowering Congress to secure exclusive rights for authors
in their writings,5 the copyright clause explicitly recognizes that in-
dividual expression is valuable in itself, deserving encouragement.'
(1943), with United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), nevertheless
provides only one means of analysis. While section 5 of the fourteenth amendment pre-
cludes contraction of individual rights guaranteed by that amendment, it simultaneously
empowers Congress to implement its policies. Similarly, this comment argues that the copy-
right clause grants Congress the power to legislate to encourage individual communication,
and that underlying both the copyright clause and the first amendment is a common per-
ception of the value of individual expression, both to society and to the individual.
5. The Constitution confers upon Congress the power only to protect "writings" of au-
thors. The term "writings" has been interpreted broadly to encompass any fixation of a
work in tangible form. The current copyright statute, enacted in 1976, affords protection to
"all the works of an author." According to the present statute, "all the works of an author"
include: literary works; musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic
works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
and sound recordings. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976). Legislative history
reveals that Congress deliberately did not follow the constitutional language by conferring
statutory protection solely upon "writings." The intent of Congress was to allow expansion
of the scope of constitutionally copyrightable subject matter along with the expansion of
technology. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5666 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
6. The copyright clause has its roots in the Statute of Anne, enacted in England in
1709. The Act codified the common law property right of an author for the fruits of his
intellectual labor. "[T]he express statutory recognition that the source of the copyright in-
terest is in the creative act of authorship, rather than in the entrepreneurship of the printer
was a major step forward." Ringer, Two Hundred Years of American Copyright Law, in
Two HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW
117, 121 (1977). All but one of the thirteen original colonies fashioned copyright laws
modeled on the antecedent English statute. The need and desire for national uniformity in
the protection of authors led to formulation of the constitutional provision. Id. at 125-26.
See also, Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 4.02 (1978).
Indeed, recognition of the right of copy can be found among primitive societies, which
often view tangible forms of artistic expression as part of the personality or the self. "In
primitive societies, notions of ownership of songs, dances, magical formulas and so forth
have often been more elaborate and more rigidly enforced than our legally established copy-
right." Cohen, Primitive Copyright, 55 A.B.A. B.J. 1144 (1969). Similar perceptions con-
tinue to form a basic premise justifying copyright protection. The "philosophical reason for
not wanting to see copyright destroyed . . . is simply a belief that copyright is one of a
number of ways in which our society expresses its belief and hope that an individual can
continue his identity in a world of mass efforts. . . ." G. SOPHAR & L. HEILPRIN, THE DETER-
MINATION OF LEGAL FACTS AND ECONOMIC GUIDEPOSTS WITH RESPECT TO THE DISSEMINATION
OF SCIENTIFIC AND EDUCATIONAL INFORMATION AS IT Is AFFECTED BY COPYRIGHT, A STATUS
REPORT viii (Final Report, Committee to Investigate Copyright Problems Affecting Commu-
nication in Science and Education, Inc., for the U.S. Department of Health, Education and
1980] 1045
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At the same time, by linking protection of authors to "the Progress
of Science and useful Arts," the copyright clause is a testament to
the instrumental significance of individual expression to the com-
mon advancement.
Through the exercise of congressional authority" to safeguard
authors' rights, and through judicial interpretation of their bounds,
a body of copyright doctrine has evolved that is sensitive to en-
couraging these values in light of new technology and competing
social interests. Accordingly, copyright status has been extended to
novel forms of expression arising from developments in the com-
munications media. As reflected in ever-increasing copyright pro-
tection in the areas of musical sound recordings, photocopying, and
cable and computer systems, Congress has consistently viewed the
promotion of individual creativity as the best means of ensuring
the benefits of continued technological change to the public.e
Welfare, Project No. 7-0793 (1967)).
7. James Madison, who, together with Charles Pinckney, proposed the copyright clause
to provide national protection for authors, asserted that:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors
has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at Common Law. The
right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors.
The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals.
The States cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the cases,
and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point by laws passed at
the instance of Congress.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison) (emphasis added); see Fenning, The Origin of the
Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109, 114 (1929).
The Supreme Court has articulated the inextricable relationship between protection for
the individual and the fostering of social progress: "The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encour-
agement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'" Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
8. Congress passed the first copyright law of the United States in 1790. Superseding
enactments followed in 1831, 1870, 1909, and 1971 (The Sound Recordings Act of 1971). The
most recent revision is the Copyright Act of 1976, which culminated over two decades of
hearings and analysis on the part of Congress and the Copyright Office. See House REPORT,
supra note 5, at 47-50. See also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, GENERAL GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT
ACT OF 1976 at 1 (1977).
One of the major features of the Copyright Act of 1976 is preemption of common law
copyright by the federal government. Previously, a state-enforced right of common law
copyright continued in perpetuity in unpublished works, with federal statutory protection
attaching only at the moment of publication. Under the new act, federal copyright protec-
tion attaches at the moment the work is reduced to tangible form. This change affords au-
thors the greater benefits accruing from federal protection and also accommodates public
need for dissemination, because the term of federal copyright protection is limited. See
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-302 (1976). Bringing copyright claims within the
scope of exclusive national protection also achieves uniformity in the protection of authors.
9. "The history of copyright law has been one of gradual expansion in all types of works
1046 [Vol. 34:1043
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Gradual expansion of first amendment protection evidences a
parallel awareness of the significance of free speech both to the
individual and to society. Free expression permits the development
of personal autonomy, which simultaneously fosters self-develop-
ment and makes possible the responsible exercise of choice. 10 The
ideal of self-government is in this way served: persons whose indi-
viduality is respected and expression is uninhibited are better able
to contribute to a truly representative social order, and citizens ex-
posed to a wide range of data are better able to make informed
decisions." Protecting individual expression thus coincides with
promoting society's vitality."
Notwithstanding the increased latitude granted certain politi-
cal and commercial expression, 3 recent Supreme Court decisions
accorded protection. . . .[S]cientific discoveries and technological developments have made
possible new forms of creative expression that never existed before." HousE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 51. These include electronic music, filmstrips, computer programs, photographs,
sound recordings, and motion pictures. Id. See also id. at 47.
10. According to Justice Brandeis, the guiding philosophy of the Constitution is a view
of liberty as both an end for individual self-development and a means for society's enlight-
enment. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Thomas
Emerson, a first amendment scholar, similarly perceived that the purpose of government is
to promote individual welfare. Emerson wrote that the freedom to express one's individual-
ity through communication was an essential prerequisite to all other freedoms and, on that
basis, a good in itself. See, e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
11. Another eminent constitutional theorist, Alexander Meiklejohn, viewed free speech
as crucial to the processes of self-government. Meiklejohn sawi the first amendment as pro-
tecting, most significantly, the individual's right to hear. Because, as the Declaration of
Independence asserts, "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned," the free flow of information is essential to ensure the informed exercise of that con-
sent on the part of each citizen. Meiklejohn, What Does The First Amendment Mean? 20 U.
CHI. L. REv. 461 (1953). See also Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Inter-
pretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1965). The Supreme Court articu-
lated the instrumental relationship between free expression and the vitality of the political
system in New York Times Co. v: Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), acknowledging the necessity
for "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" debate on public issues. Id. at 270. A similar rela-
tionship exists between free commercial speech and intelligent public behavior in a free
economy. See notes 33-39 and accompanying text infra.
12. Following such a view of first amendment values, the Court gradually abandoned
earlier judicial attempts to define the parameters of permissible speech according to a deter-
mination of its social acceptability. Because the fostering of individual autonomy offered the
best assurance for maintaining a democratic society, speech came to be valued for itself,
regardless of the motivation of its speaker or tastefulness of its content. Thus, the Court
extended first amendment protection to speech advocating subversive political viewpoints,
Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969), language offensive to majoritarian sensibili-
ties, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971), an expression critical of public officials,
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), except in certain narrow,
specifically defined instances of overriding state interest.
13. See note 12 supra and notes 28-40 infra.
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demonstrate a growing paternalism, restricting first amendment
protection in the face of other values imposed by majoritarian sen-
sibilities. Concerns for protecting the quality of life14 and guarding
personal interests from deception15 and intrusive communications"
ostensibly underlie the Court's occasional balance against free ex-
pression. Recent decisions, however, betray a view of speech as de-
riving its legitimacy in large part from judgments about the social
utility of its content.1 The trend not only departs from established
first amendment jurisprudence, 5 but is inconsistent with the un-
derstanding developed under copyright law, in which the balance
between creativity and other competing interests weighs in favor of
encouraging free expression. 9
This comment will evaluate recent first amendment analysis
by comparing it to the results achieved under the copyright clause
through congressional policy and judicial case law. The discussion
will trace the development of first amendment doctrine for com-
mercial and offensive speech, with emphasis on how it follows or
differs from that of copyright. The author will then examine the
14. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).
15. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
16. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
17. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), four justices agreed
that states "may legitimately use the content of (pornographic movies] as the basis for plac-
ing them in a different classification from other motion pictures" consistent with the first
and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 70-71 (plurality opinion).
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), three justices agreed that the first
amendment does not prohibit all government regulation that depends on the content of
speech. Id. at 744 (plurality opinion). Justice Powell, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred
because of "the unique characteristics of the broadcast media, combined with society's right
to protect its children from speech generally agreed to be inappropriate for their years, and
with the interest of unwilling adults in not being assaulted by such offensive speech in their
homes." Id. at 762 (Powell, J., concurring). As Professor Emerson explains:
[Tihe Burger court is only one vote shy of a majority that expressly takes into
account its view of the social value of a particular communication in determining
whether or to what extent such expression will be protected under the first
amendment. Further, that approach is implicit in other rulings subscribed to by
a clear majority of the Court.
Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 422, 452
(1980).
18. In Pacifica, the majority agreed that a monologue including seven "cuss words,"
words "you couldn't say on the public ... airwaves," was not obscene in the constitutional
sense, but that given the content of the speech, its broadcast at times children were likely to
listen was proscribable. Thus the decision implicitly expanded the domain of proscribable
speech (except for fighting words) to embrace more than obscenity, inevitably limiting the
words that people speak according to prevailing notions of acceptability. See 34 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 147 (1979).
19. See section III infra.
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balance that copyright law strikes between individual and public
interests through the doctrines of fair use, compulsory license, and
moral rights, because they offer the Court guidance for the best
reconciliation of conflicting claims in the first amendment context.
Through this comparative analysis, the flexibility of copyright poli-
cies in responding to changes in the area of communications will
emerge as more consonant with a dynamic, constitutional ap-
proach to free expression.2 The comment therefore advocates that
the Court consider the values of expression justifying broadened
copyright protection to be equally relevant in adjudicating first
amendment claims, requiring higher levels of justification for offi-
cial proscription of speech.
II. THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL VALUE IN FIRST AMENDMENT AND
COPYRIGHT CONTEXTS
A. Commercial Speech
The preservation of individual autonomy in all areas of social
decisionmaking underlies the expansion of ffrst amendment protec-
tion beyond purely ideological messages.2 1 Because the wide dis-
semination of data is a crucial means of assuring informed exercise
of choice, the Court has recognized such dissemination, regardless
of its character or motivation, as a basic corollary of freedom of
expression.2
Nevertheless, a hierarchy of speech based on the social utility
that judges attribute to various types of messages continues to ex-
ist, and the degree of first amendment protection afforded speech
varies according to this hierarchy."3 Thus, the underlying profit
motive and accompanying possibility of deception in commercial
20. The word "constitutional" applies in the sense of that which develops organically.
Its significance parallels that of Justice Marshall's oft-quoted phrase: "[W]e must never
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original). Justice Holmes expressed a similar opinion
in Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914):
[T]he provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas having their
essence in their form; they are organic living institutions transplanted from En-
glish soil. Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be gathered not simply by
taking the words and a dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of
their growth.
21. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
22. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431
U.S. 85 (1977).
23. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 439 U.S. 726 (1978).
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speech lower its position on the scale of first amendment values.
This lower position for commercial speech heightens the permissi-
ble degree of its abridgment by the government to an extent that
would be impermissible for noncommercial expression."'
To avoid paternalistic inroads on the overriding right of indi-
vidual access to information, the courts should scrutinize the regu-
lation of economically motivated speech according to the same
strict standard applied to noncommercial expression.25 Some first
amendment decisions provide support for the application of such a
heightened standard; more may be derived from copyright doc-
trine, which makes no distinction between the copyrightability of
speech laden with blatantly political or artistic messages, as op-
posed to economic messages. In copyright doctrine, protection of
original contributions, whatever their content or motivation, is the
key to fulfilling the constitutional goal of promoting "the Progress
of Science and useful Arts."' In the same way that preserving
original contributions is the guardian of cultural progress in the
area of copyright, fostering independent decisionmaking and insu-
lating the sphere of intellect and spirit from all official control may
be seen as the mainstay of the stable yet evolving society envi-
sioned by the first amendment's framers.2 The value of speech,
both to the individual and to society, should be recognized as con-
stant under the first amendment, whether its content is political or
economic.
Yet only recently has the Court affirmed that the flourishing
of all communication is socially significant in itself, and extended
even limited first amendment protection to speech conveying com-
mercial information. Originally, the Court viewed commercial
speech as altogether outside the scope of first amendment protec-
tion. The underlying profit motive of commercial speakers made
such messages inherently less valuable to society. Dissemination of
seemingly mundane commercial information, as opposed to the
communication of ideas, appeared to the Court to be of little value
in the search for truth and the maintenance of a politically in-
formed electorate. 8
24. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979).
25. See note 12 supra.
26. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 253 (1903) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
27. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
28. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), in which the Court upheld a
ban on the distribution of leaflets that both solicited customers for a submarine tour and
protested the city's denial of permission to exhibit the submarine on a city pier. The Court
[Vol. 34:10431050
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The commercial context of speech, however, did not bar its
constitutional protection in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, e in
which, on first amendment grounds, the Court protected from a
libel action a paid advertisement containing a political protest.
The Court rejected the argument that the commercial nature of
the speech took it outside the scope of the first amendment. Rec-
ognizing that editorial advertisements, such as the one at issue in
the Sullivan case, are "an important outlet for the promulgation of
information and ideas by persons who do not themselves have ac-
cess to publishing facilities," Justice Brennan wrote: "[I]f the al-
legedly libelous statements would otherwise be constitutionally
protected from the present judgment, they do not forfeit that pro-
tection because they were published in the form of a paid
advertisement. "30
Justice Brennan, in a later dissent, emphasized that advertis-
ing may provide a legitimate and significant forum for disseminat-
ing information and expressing ideas.31 He attacked a city ordi-
nance banning political advertising on buses, while allowing
commercial advertising. Justice Brennan opposed any distinction
for first amendment purposes between speech labeled ideological
and messages deemed commercial, arguing that freedom of expres-
sion should guarantee the broad communication of all ideas, eco-
nomic or political.32
characterized the city's ban as a regulation of business activity, not a proscription of speech.
In Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), the Court held that the privacy interests of
householders outweighed claimed speech rights of uninvited door-to-door solicitors of maga-
zine subscriptions and added that the right of free speech had never been treated as abso-
lute and is often subordinate to the rights of others. Id. at 642.
29. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
30. Id. at 266. But see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376
(1973), in which the Court refused to extend the rationale of Sullivan to newspaper listings
of job advertisements, covered by an anti-sexual discrimination ordinance, in help-wanted
columns designated by sex. Justice Powell, reiterated that purely commercial speech was not
entitled to full first amendment protection. His finding that the advertising restriction was
merely incidental to a valid limitation of economic activity mirrored Justice Roberts's ear-
lier stance in Valentine, and revived the distinction between commercial and other types of
speech. In dissent, however, four justices preferred to confer first amendment protection
upon commercial speech, at least when communicated in a newspaper. 413 U.S. 376, 393
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). In one dissenter's view, Sullivan had fully established the right of
the press to control the content of speech it conveys, regardless of whether it is political or
commercial in nature. 413 U.S. 376, 401 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
31. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 308-22 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
32. Justice Brennan asserted that commercial speech deserves at least some degree of
first amendment protection, although he declined to address the issue of how much. 418
U.S. at 314-15 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He added that commercial advertising is speech
1980]
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The Court later receded from inquiring into the social value of
speech, in Bigelow v. Virginia.3 s Extending first amendment pro-
tection to advertisements for abortions, the Court asserted that
"[tihe relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of
services does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas. ' '3 4
A later, more expansive decision held that commercial speech
should not be denied protection on the basis of judicial determina-
tions of its social utility. In that case, Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,s the Court
struck down a prohibition on prescription drug advertising by
pharmacists, based on the consumers' right to receive information.
The Court rejected its earlier assertions that "speech which does
'no more than propose a commercial transaction' ... is so re-
moved from any 'exposition of ideas' ... that it lacks all
protection." 6
Instead, the Court vindicated the consumer's right to receive
information, grounded on society's concern for preserving the free
flow of a variety of data. It perceived such widespread availability
of all types of information as fostering responsible decisionmaking
in a free economy. The Court abandoned the view that advertising
is less socially beneficial than openly political or ideological speech,
stating that a "consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information. . . may be as keen [as], if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day's most urgent political debate. "'7
In an important decision marking the breadth of the commer-
cial speech doctrine, the Court struck down a state ban on the ad-
nonetheless, often communicating information and ideas contributing to the first amend-
ment ideal of nurturing "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" expression of ideas and de-
bate on public issues. Id. at 314-15.
33. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
34. Id. at 826.
35. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
36. Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376,
385 (1973)); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
37. 425 U.S. at 763. The Court later extended first amendment protection to corporate
advertising in First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). It stated that
speech is indispensable to democracy, regardless of the mode or content of its expression,
and regardless that the speaker is a corporation rather than an individual: "The inherent
worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon
the identity of its source." Id. at 777. Dissenting Justice White, however, would have denied
protection to the corporation. He argued that the additional value of speech to individuals
as a means of emotive expression and self-realization is simply not present in the case of a
corporation; hence, government regulation of such communications need not undergo strict
scrutiny. Id. at 804-05.
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vertisement and display of nonprescription contraceptives."8 Argu-
ments that the advertisements were offensive and ultimately would
legitimize promiscuous sexual activity of young people could not
withstand the strict judicial scrutiny applied to the regulation of
speech, albeit commercial, that was not obscene.3 9
The most recent case dealing with commercial speech, how-
ever, retreats from the Court's earlier willingness to extend broad
first amendment protection to advertising. The lower court in
Friedman v. Rogers"° had held unconstitutional a state prohibition
on the practice of optometry under a trade name, because it un-
duly restricted the free flow of commercial information. Reversing
that decision, the Supreme Court upheld the ban as a means of
protecting the public from possible deceptive uses of such trade
names. The Court categorized trade names as requiring less first
amendment protection because they do not convey information
about price or quality or any other particularly newsworthy fact.
4
"
Friedman v. Rogers is troublesome because the state failed to
present any concrete evidence that optometrist service trade
names are anything but useful to eyeglass customers. The Court's
decision appears to be an exercise of unwarranted paternalism be-
cause, in the guise of protecting the public, the majority closed off
avenues of commercial information to consumers who are able to
"perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough in-
formed," as the Court had noted only two years earlier in Virginia
Board of Pharmacy.'2 The Court's cutback in the degree of protec-
38. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
39. Justice Brennan relied on the stringent test for banning offensive language which
Justice Harlan had articulated in Cohen. The "essentially intolerable" level of offensiveness
required to justify the speech ban according to the Cohen standard was simply not present
in Carey; nor did the advertisements incite unlawful conduct so as to be proscribable under
the Brandenburg test. 431 U.S. at 701.
40. 438 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
41. The Court distinguished Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy on the grounds that the subject
of those advertisements was specific, factual information-drug prices. Trade names, on the
other hand, represent nothing more than solicitation of patronage. Because consumers regu-
larly associate trade names with price, quality, and related commercial information, the
Court noted that they could be deceived in the event that the trade name remained the
same while the nature or quality of the services changed. 440 U.S. at 12-13.
42. 425 U.S. at 770. Holding that people are entitled to the broadest possible exposure
to all sorts of speech messages in order to develop their own ability to make responsible
decisions, the Court struck down an ordinance prohibiting the posting of real estate "for
sale" signs, in Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). The purpose of the
restriction was to prevent an exodus of white homeowners from the area, but the Court
found it overly paternalistic.
A parallel concern for supplying the public's need for the free flow of information led
the Court to invalidate a bar association disciplinary rule prohibiting lawyers from advertis-
1980] 1053
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tion afforded commercial speech, ostensibly to protect the public
from possible deception, mirrors its concern for preserving the sta-
bility and "civility" of social mores reflected in the lowered stan-
dard for scrutinizing bans on offensive and obscene speech. 3
A first amendment doctrine that links the value of speech to
the motive of the speaker and the charachter of the expression4 "
contravenes the value of expression as perceived in copyright cases.
The commercial use to which a work is put is irrelevant to a deter-
mination of its copyrightability. Further, works that convey only
factual information, as opposed to aesthetic or intellectual "ideas,"
regularly receive full copyright status. In Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co.'5 a painting used as part of an advertising
poster was nevertheless copyrightable. Information directories and
other factual works are similarly copyrightable, because they con-
tribute equally to "the Progress of Science and useful Arts.""
For the same reasons, the Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein47
upheld the copyright of a statuette intended for mass production
as a lamp base. Such protection of individual expression without
regard to its intended use or motivation was, in the Court's view,
the best means of encouraging literary or artistic works and
thereby advancing the public welfare. The Court reasoned: "The
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to
grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors. . .."48
Congress codified the holding of Mazer in a provision of the
Copyright Act of 1976, which extends copyright protection to pic-
torial, graphic, or sculptural works, regardless of their intended
use. Legislative intent is clear:
[T]he definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"
ing. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
43. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text supra.
44. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978).
.45. 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ("A picture is none the less a picture and none the less a
subject of copyright that it is used for an advertisement.").
46. See Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (answer sheets used for IQ tests and corrected by machines are within the
constitutional requirement of "writings" and hence protectible under the copyright law).
See also Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Jeweler's Circular
Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922). Expression, in the con-
text of a factual work, consists of the author's particular selection, ordering, and arrange-
ment of facts. Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977).
47. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
48. Id. at 219.
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carries with it no implied criterion of artistic taste, aesthetic
value, or intrinsic quality. The term is intended to comprise not
only "works of art" in the traditional sense but also works of
graphic art and illustration, art reproductions, plans and draw-
ings, photographs and reproductions of them, maps, charts,
globes, and other cartographic work, works of these kinds in-
tended for use in advertising and commerce, and works of "ap-
plied art" . . . . In accordance with . . . Mazer v. Stein . . .
works of "applied art" encompass all original pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works that are intended to be or have been em-
bodied in useful articles, regardless of factors such as mass pro-
duction [and] commercial exploitation. .... 49
According to the new Act, a useful article has "an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of
the article or to convey information. '50 Such an article deserves
copyright protection only to the extent that it contains a separable
part that is expressive in some manner, apart from its utilitarian
aspects. This distinction reflects the essential tenet of copyright
theory that the contribution to the "Progress of Science and useful
Arts" is the originality of a work, rather than its functional utility.
A refusal to evaluate communications according to their con-
tent or purpose is the wisest means of fulfilling the constitutional
vision of cultural progress. Were the Court to apply this same in-
sight to its analysis of commercial speech claims, it would not rank
such messages lower than noncommercial speech in the first
amendment hierarchy. The Court should view expanded protection
for commercial speech as the best way of fostering informed deci-
sionmaking. Like the requirement in defamation cases that a
plaintiff prove "actual malice" to justify a ban on speech directed
at public officials,5 1 and the requirement that a speaker must
threaten imminent lawless action to justify suppression of subver-
sive speech,2 the Court should require a more stringent standard
to justify government restriction of commercial speech. Except
when a litigant proves actual deception, the guiding philosophy of
the Court in dealing with commercial messages should be a com-
mitment to encouraging "more speech, not enforced silence." 3
49. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 54.
50. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
51. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
52. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
53. 440 U.S. 1, 25 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
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B. Obscene and Offensive Speech
The value of communication lies not only in promoting in-
formed political or economic decisionmaking, but also in permit-
ting the expression of individuality and, hence, alternative con-
cepts of society. To the extent that government attempts to
suppress dissemination of messages that deviate from prevailing
moral notions, it risks violation of this basic tenet of free speech."
Under the proferred analytic framework, the government should
not abridge an individual's right to wide exposure to commercial
data, absent a showing of actual deception or intolerable intrusive-
ness. Similarly, the right to free speech should forbid the govern-
ment to protect people from what it considers undesirable
thoughts of a sexual nature. Only when destructive conduct is
threatened or likely to ensue should the courts permit governmen-
tal regulation of speech dealing with sexual matters.
Currently, however, a majority of the Court remains commit-
ted to discovering a proper standard for proscribing obscenity, in
an unflagging belief that obscenity is unprotected by the first
amendment because its message can make no positive contribution
to society.55 The various definitions adopted by the Court focus in-
variably on the deviation of purportedly obscene language from es-
tablished views of morality-its "patent offensiveness" and lack of
"serious value."" Moreover, speech containing sexual or excretory
imagery, even if not obscene, may nevertheless be proscribed as
"indecent" when it might reach the ears of unwilling adults or chil-
dren over the broadcast airwaves.5
As a minority, Justices Black and Douglas consistently es-
chewed all efforts to limit even "obscene" speech." In their view,
54. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
55. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
56. Id. at 24.
57. In the recent case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), the Court
interpreted a statutory ban on the broadcast of "obscene, indecent, or profane" speech as
creating separate proscribable categories. It held that indecent speech, language dealing
with sexual or excretory matters in "patently offensive" terms, was a different category than
obscene speech. This broad reading of the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976), passed first
amendment muster in light of what the court asserted to be the particularly intrusive nature
of broadcasting and its accessibility to children. Emphasizing that its holding was limited to
the special factual situation at hand, the Court did not discuss whether the statutory use of
the term "profane" indicates yet a third category of abridgable broadcast speech.
58. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Ko-
nigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I believe that the First
Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgment of the rights of free
speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balanc-
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the first amendment derives from a prior balancing on the part of
the framers between social mores and individual rights. They ad-
vocated extension of first amendment protection to all speech, re-
gardless of its purported pruriency or offensiveness. Most crucially,
they perceived that an essential purpose of the first amendment is
to protect speech because of its very individuality, regardless of its
aberration from prevailing standards, whether in matters of sexual-
ity, ideology, or taste. As Justice Douglas argued, dissenting in
Miller v. California:
The First Amendment was not fashioned as a vehicle for dis-
persing tranquilizers to the people. Its prime function was to
keep debate open to "offensive" as well as to "staid" peo-
ple .... The use of the standard "offensive" gives authority to
government that cuts the very vitals out of the First
Amendment.5 9
Copyright doctrine strongly supports such a refusal to attri-
bute to speech varying degrees of social value based on its content
or motivation. Congress has pursued the ideal of cultural progress
expressed in the copyright clause through adoption of a standard
of originality, which affords copyright protection not only to works
that please a majority, but to any works that represent an author's
original expression of ideas. 0 All contributions that stem from the
individual possess an intrinsic social worth, according to copyright
doctrine. Bringing this perspective to the first amendment context,
the Court should deem all expression valuable insofar as it repre-
sents the communications of an individual, for those unique ideas
and feelings provide the substance for society's growth. Thus, any
standard of first amendment protection that requires evaluation of
the content or style of speech according to its conformity to
majoritarian taste contravenes the overriding necessity for free and
broad communication.
Nevertheless, the Court has consistently labeled obscene
speech socially valueless, and hence abridgable, in part because it
deviates from accepted views of sexual morality: "[S]uch utter-
ances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
ing' that was to be done in this field.").
59. 413 U.S. 15, 44-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
60. See HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 51.
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order and morality." '
On the basis of such reasoning, the Court has defined obscen-
ity as speech "utterly without redeeming social importance.""'
Roth v. United States" involved an unsuccessful challenge to fed-
eral and state obscenity statutes on the ground that they "punish
incitation to impure sexual thoughts, not shown to be related to
any overt antisocial conduct which is or may be incited in the per-
sons stimulated to such thoughts."" Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, refused to require that a finding of censorable ob-
scenity be based upon proof of imminent reactive violence, the
standard used to outlaw politically subversive speech. 5 The pres-
ence of a dominant theme appealing to prurient interests-that is,
a theme that incites lustful thoughts-was sufficient to render the
speech outside first amendment protection.
The Court soon retreated from the position that the state
could protect people from unpopular or immoral thoughts. It
struck down a New York law, under which officials denied a license
to show the film version of Lady Chatterley's Lover on the
grounds that it portrayed adultery as proper behavior:
[The state's] argument misconceives what it is that the Consti-
tution protects. Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of
ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects
advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper,
no less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax. And in the
realm of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no less
than that which is unconvincing."
An important aspect of the case was that the state failed to claim
that the film, if shown, would incite illegal action. Its aim, accord-
ing to the Court, was clearly unconstitutional: the suppression of
an idea. Importantly, the decision exposed the difficulties inherent
61. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
62. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
63. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
64. Id. at 485-86. As first amendment absolutists, Justices Black and Douglas believed
that obscenity was not constitutionally proscribable. In their view, however, accompanying
conduct may be subject to governmental regulation. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Yet, particularly in cases where conduct is actually
symbolic of speech, the dichotomy is often contrived. Recognizing this point, the Court has
extended protection to conduct which conveys a message, beyond the mere performance of
an act. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
65. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (prohibiting subversive speech only
when it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action").
66. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959).
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in the Roth standard, because Roth did not distinguish between
incitement to action and mere stimulation of thought.
The Court took one further step toward completely recogniz-
ing the right to personal autonomy in Stanley v. Georgia,67 invali-
dating a Georgia law against knowing possession of obscene matter.
The Court held that under the first and fourteenth amendments,
the state could not legislate to protect a person's mind from the
effects of obscenity. This recognition of the individual's "right to
receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth,' ' "s
undermines the validity of any standard that proscribes certain
speech based on an evaluation of its social import.
Yet reliance on just such a concept of social worth persists in
obscenity doctrine, notwithstanding Chief Justice Burger's asser-
tion in Miller v. California" that "[tihis is an area in which there
are few eternal verities. '7 0 The Chief Justice "reject[ed], as a con-
stitutional standard, the ambiguous concept of 'social impor-
tance' "7 that the Roth Court had relied upon. 5 Instead, he in-
quired "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. '7 8 The Chief Justice failed,
however, to explain why judgment of works according to the
equally subjective standard of "serious . . . value" possesses any
greater legitimacy.71
67. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). "Whatever the power of the state to control public dissemina-
tion of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on
the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts." Id. at 566. See also Justice
Harlan's dissenting opinion in Roth: "[Ifn no event do I think that the limited federal inter-
est in this area can extend to mere 'thoughts.' The Federal Government has no business,
whether under the postal or commerce power, to bar the sale of books because they might
lead to any kind of 'thoughts.'" 354 U.S. at 507.
68. 394 U.S. at 564.
69. 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973).
70. Id. at 23.
71. Id. at 25 n.7.
72. 354 U.S. at 484.
73. 413 U.S. at 24. The test has two other prongs: whether the work appeals to the
prurient interest and whether it depicts, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined in the state law. Id.
74. In an attempt to clarify his definition of obscenity, Chief Justice Burger relied on a
distinction between sexual matter disseminated "for its own sake, and for the ensuing com-
mercial gain," 413 U.S. at 35, and other types of ideas. The Chief Justice reiterated this
concern in the companion case, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), when he
justified censorship of obscenity as an effort to protect the "social interest in order and
morality," id. at 61, from its debasement by "crass commercial exploitation of sex," id. at
63. Such reasoning reveals a view of speech very different from that articulated by Justice
Marshall in Stanley, which emphasized the state's lack of authority to determine, for the
individual, the social import of expression. 394 U.S. at 565-66. In Paris, Chief Justice Burger
distinguished Stanley as applicable only to those situations implicating privacy interests in
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Perceiving this inconsistency, Justice Brennan dissented75
from the Court's new formulation of obscenity and espoused the
right of consenting adults to receive all communications. Reexam-
ining his own opinion in Roth, along with the seemingly endless
array of obscenity standards framed subsequently," Justice Bren-
nan criticized the Court for engaging all along in an impossible, if
not impermissible task: attempting to render objective evaluations
under a standard that, at bottom, could never escape being subjec-
tive. Concepts such as "prurient interest," "patent offensiveness,"
and "serious literary value" generated by Roth and its progeny
were all too vague and too relative; they led to judgments based on
little more than taste or point of view." Indeed, Justice Brennan
recognized that because the value of particular communications re-
mains a matter for individual judgment, the very search for a co-
herent obscenity standard may be constitutionally infirm.
Justice Harlan had earlier expressed an awareness of that pos-
sibility in the context of nonprurient, offensive speech.78 Writing
for the majority in Cohen v. California,7 9 he perceived that speech
has a value of its own, which makes it significant to the individual
and to society simultaneously. He wrote that language is more
than a mode of conveying rational thought; it possesses a symbolic,
emotive aspect, as well. 80 For that reason, matters of taste and
style must be left to the individual. Apart from its particular con-
tent or form, speech is thus important as a means of promoting
individual dignity,8a as a safety valve for minority opinions in a
one's home; consequently, he found no fundamental privacy right to watch obscene movies
in places of public accommodation, even in adult theatres expressly excluding minors.
75. 413 U.S. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. "[Alfter 16 years of experimentation and debate I am reluctantly forced to the con-
clusion that none of the available formulas, including the one announced today, can reduce
the vagueness to a tolerable level .... " 413 U.S. at 84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. Justice Stewart revealed, perhaps inadvertently, the utter confusion plaguing the
Court in its attempts to define obscenity when he spoke of hard-core pornography: "I shall
not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced
within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing
so. But I know it when I see it. ... Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart,
J., concurring),
78. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), a man had been convicted of disturbing
the peace for wearing a jacket that bore the words "Puck the Draft," as he stood outside a
county courtroom. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Harlan, reversed the conviction.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 26.
81. Id. at 24. See also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); Emerson, supra note 10, at 880-82.
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pluralistic society,82 and, ultimately, as a way of fostering society's
advancement."'
Just as the view that speech is essential to maintaining robust
political debate in a representative democracy led the Court in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan" to require "actual malice" as a
basis for a libel action brought by public officials, and in Branden-
burg v. Ohio8" to require a danger of imminent lawless action to
justify government censorship of subversive expression, so too a
sensitivity to the inherent value of free speech and the concomi-
tant inability of judges to evaluate the worth of any particular
communication led Justice Harlan to formulate in Cohen a simi-
larly stringent test for "offensive" speech:
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to
shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in
other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.
Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a
majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal
predilections.8"
Yet, the prevailing Miller standard for censorship of obscenity,
with its "serious value" prong, cannot be reconciled with the Co-
hen formulation of speech values. In disposing of first amendment
claims, the Burger Court has ignored the correlation of un-
restricted individual expression with society's good, regardless of
the subjectively assessed worth of such expression.
In the recent case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,7 the Burger
Court demonstrated its resolve to equate the content and context
of communication with its social value and, hence, with its degree
of first amendment protection." A plurality of the Court invoked
the special nature of the broadcasting medium to approve a re-
striction on the broadcast of sexual and excretory language. In the
view of the Court, the minimal significance of such language in
conveying ideas, together with its offensiveness to prevailing audi-
82. "The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as
diverse and populous as ours." Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24. Language, then, is an alternative to,
and a preventive of, the expression of hostility through violent behavior. See also Emerson,
supra note 10, at 885.
83. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24-25.
84. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
85. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
86. 403 U.S. at 21.
87. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
88. Id. at 744-45.
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ence sensibilities, justified the lower standard of first amendment
protection.
In contrast, the concept of social value reflected in the present
Court's formulations of obscenity and offensive speech doctrine is
simply absent from and inconsistent with copyright law. Copyright
recognizes that the social value of speech lies as much in its devi-
ance from, as in its adherence to, prevailing standards of accepta-
bility. Justice Holmes acknowledged this value over half a century
ago in the cornerstone copyright case of Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co.:89
The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature.
Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its
singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art
has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That
something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the
words of the act.90
Justice Holmes refused to assess the artistic worth of the
painting sought to be copyrighted. He characterized judgments
about literary or artistic value as nothing more than matters of
taste. Since concepts of aesthetic value vary over time, it would be
a travesty of copyright's purpose-to promote cultural pro-
gress-were protection accorded only to those works whose merit
judges had certified. The task of government, rather, is to facilitate
the broadest possible dissemination of all kinds of original commu-
nications, leaving to the public the ultimate decision regarding the
worth of copyrighted materials:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pic-
torial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious
limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure
to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them re-
pulsive until the public had learned the new language in which
their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance,
whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would
have been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the
other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed
to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they command
the interest of any public, they have a commercial value-it
would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educa-
tional value-and the taste of any public is not to be treated
89. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).




Justice Holmes declared that the best means of fostering cul-
tural progress was through protection of originality. As the stan-
dard for copyrightability, originality refers to any tangible expres-
sions that have their source in the individual. Independent
creation alone assures copyright status.'2 Such judicial recognition
of the value to society's progress of unique, individual work, was an
extension of reasoning found in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony,95 decided in 1884. The Court in Burrow-Giles explicitly
defined the constitutional standard of copyrightability-
originality-as meaning anything owing its origin to the individual
creator.
The Burrow-Giles Court contrasted this copyright standard
with the far more stringent standard required for patentabil-
ity-novelty-which requires both a high level of creativity and
newness. Close scrutiny of the patent applicant is necessary to as-
certain not only whether the invention is a product of independent
work on the part of the prospective patent holder, but also
whether the invention is of substantive benefit to the advancement
of science. Moreover, although two individuals may obtain copy-
right protection for exactly the same work as long as each has in-
dependently created the work and there is no plagiarism, an inven-
tion is patentable only if it is entirely new; it must be a discovery
that no one else has ever made before."
The different standards for copyright and patent eligibility re-
flect a distinction in viewing.how government can best stimulate
and protect cultural, as opposed to scientific, progess. Indeed, the
very words of the copyright clause suggest that such a difference
exists: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
91. Id. at 251-52. Justice Holmes' argument, if applied in the first amendment context,
would question the validity of outlawing speech as obscene based upon a jury's assessment
of "prevailing community standards." His views also support the observation of Justice
Brennan who, dissenting in Pacifica, cited data indicating that a significant portion of the
listening audience, albeit a minority, possesses different cultural attitudes towards language
and does not find the language of George Carlin's monologue offensive. 438 U.S. at 776
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. M. NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 2.01 (1978).
93. 111 U.S. 53 (1884). The Court interpreted the constitutional term "writings" to in-
clude photographs, based on its interpretation of legislative history and the purpose of copy-
right, as the protection of "all forms . . . by which the ideas in the mind of the author are
given visible expression." Id. at 58.
94. Id. See also Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951)
("A patentee, unlike a copyrightee, must not merely produce something 'original'; he must
also be 'the first inventor or discoverer.' ").
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securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."95 Analysis of
its linguistic structure demonstrates that the term "authors" is
parallel with the term "writings," which, in turn, is parallel with
the term "science." Perusal of legislative history reveals that in co-
lonial times "science" referred to authors' works."' From such a
reading, one may infer that although inventions-the "useful
Arts"-derive significance from their functional utility, writings
form part of a cultural body-"Science"-presumed valuable with-
out need of a modifier such as "useful." In other words, writings
themselves have importance and therefore need no additional
pragmatic utility. The extension of copyright protection to works
that are original-that is, owing their origin to an author-derives
from a constitutionally grounded awareness: Expression is valuable
to society because of its indivduality, not because a court has pre-
viously scrutinized its content to determine its social worth.9 7
In Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,as Judge Frank ex-
plained further the distinction between copyright and patent pro-
tection. A valid patent requires a "substantial advance over the
prior art."99 Originality, on the other hand, will validate a copy-
right without regard to the level of creativity it demonstrates be-
cause, as Justice Holmes recognized in Bleistein, such determina-
tions are matters of taste, and hence, not objectively determinable.
For that reason, a work fully satisfies the Constitution and the
copyright statutes enacted under it when "the 'author' contrib-
ute[s] something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, something
recognizably 'his own.' Originality in this context 'means little
more than a prohibition of actual copying.' No matter how poor
artistically the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his own." 100
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
96. See M. NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 1.03 [A] (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1 (1966)).
97. Thus legislators peculiarly familiar with the purpose of the Constitutional
grant, by statute, imposed far less exacting standards in the case of copyrights.
They authorized the copyrighting of a mere map which, patently, calls for no
considerable uniqueness. They exacted far more from an inventor. And, while
they demanded that an official should be satisfied as to the character of an in-
vention before a patent issued, they made no such demand in respect of a copy-
right. . . . Accordingly, the Constitution, as so interpreted, recognizes that the
standards for patents and copyrights are basically different.
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1951).
98. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
99. Id. at 104.
100. Id. at 103 (quoting Hoague-Sprague Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer, Inc., 31 F.2d 583,
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In enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress clearly in-
tended that copyright be available without the need for substan-
tive evaluation of the worth of the copy:10 1 "The term 'literary
works' does not connote any criterion of literary merit or qualita-
tive value: it includes catalogues, directories, and similar factual,
reference, or instructional works and compilations of data. 'I
0 2
Importantly, even obscene works are fully copyrightable. In
Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater,10 the Fifth
Circuit held that the obscenity of the copyrighted material is no
defense to an infringement action, because "[there is no . . . stat-
utory language from which it can be inferred that Congress in-
tended that obscene materials could not be copyrighted."' 0 ' Ac-
cording to the court,
Congress has concluded that the constitutional purpose of its
copyright power ... is best served by allowing all creative
works (in a copyrightable format) to be accorded copyright pro-
tection regardless of subject matter or content, trusting to the
public taste to reward creators of useful works and to deny cre-
ators of useless works any reward." 5
586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929)). A recent Second Circuit decision, L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536
F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976), refused to allow the copyright of a plastic toy Uncle Sam bank
copied from an iron version in the public domain. Evaluating the level of skill required, the
degree and purpose of the change, and the nature of the reproduced work, the majority
found that it lacked the required originality to warrant copyright; "substantial variation"
from the original was necessary. The dissent rejected the majority's analysis because, as
noted in Alfred Bell, "even an inadvertent variation can form the basis of a valid copy-
right." 536 F.2d at 493. To the extent the case can be read to require a high degree of
originality for copyright, it is inconsistent with prior copyright doctrine.
101. In Batlin, the court contrasted the toy reproduction with an exact replica of a
Rodin sculpture, which received copyright in Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp
265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), because "'great skill and originality' were required 'to produce a scale
reduction of a great work with exactitude.'" 536 F.2d at 491 (quoting 177 F. Supp. at 267).
The opinion adds:
Rodin's sculpture is, furthermore, so unique and rare, and adequate public ac-
cess to it such a problem that a significant public benefit accrues from its pre-
cise, artistic reproduction. No such benefit can be imagined to accrue here from
the "knock-off"' reproduction of the cast iron Uncle Sam bank. Thus [the]
plastic bank is neither in the category of exactitude required by Alva Studios
nor in a category of substantial originality; it falls within . . . a copyright no-
man's land.
536 F.2d at 492. The suggestion, clearly obiter dictum, that social worth is a relevant crite-
rion for copyright, is original with Batlin; it was not even a factor in the Alva Studios
opinion. "Public benefit" has never had and does not have a place in copyright law.
102. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 54.
103. 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979).
104. Id. at 854.
105. Id. at 855.
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The philosophy of the copyright clause, as reflected in prevail-
ing legislative and judicial pronouncements, recognizes that the
protection of communication in its tangible manifestations is so-
cially beneficial. Individual autonomy and its multifarious modes
of expression are significant because they contribute to the overall
progress of society. Society affords authors copyright protection
not as a result of judgments about the quality of expression, but as
a reward for that aberrant spark of uniqueness that copyright the-
ory views as essential to society's welfare.
On the other hand, recent cutbacks in the degree of first
amendment protection for speech dealing with sexual, excretory, or
otherwise offensive material may be attributed to a countervailing
concern of the Court: a desire to preserve the status quo of society,
according to legislative determinations and the Court's sensitivi-
ties. The ensuing lowering of first amendment standards in justify-
ing proscription of speech, however, simultaneously inhibits the
possibility of society's creative evolution. A greater deference to in-
dividual communications would require a more rigorous standard
akin to that fashioned by Justice Harlan in Cohen. Instead of eval-
uating purportedly obscene or offensive speech according to a
taste-ridden yardstick of "social value," proscription would be per-
missible only when there is a danger of imminent violence or oth-
erwise unlawful action. Such a heightened standard, consistent
with the speech values perceived by the Court in dealing with cop-
yright questions, would permit the preservation of social order,
while at the same time providing the means for its imaginative
growth.
III. INDIVIDUAL EXPRESSION AND THE GROWTH OF MASS MEDIA
Just as the commercial or sexual content of speech has been
invoked to lower its perceived social value, and hence its entitle-
ment to constitutional protection, so the very media in which
messages are communicated similarly trigger distinctions in the de-
gree of their first amendment protection. Thus, government may
proscribe even nonobscene speech as "indecent" when broadcast
over the airwaves, out of deference to countervailing privacy rights
of adults and concern for insulating children.10"
By following such a balancing methodology, however, the
Court has shifted focus from a central goal of the first amendment:
furtherance of the widest possible communication among society's
106. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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members. Perceiving broadcast media to pose a threat to tradi-
tional privacy interests, the Court has accentuated distinctions be-
tween modes of communcation as a rationale for increased speech
regulation.10 7 In so doing, it has overlooked the intrinsic signifi-
cance of all messages, regardless of their medium,108 to the devel-
opment of individual autonomy and, thereby, a progressive society.
The relation of public welfare to individual rights has been re-
garded entirely differently in the area of copyright. Congress has
greeted and ultimately accommodated the expansion of technol-
ogy, leading to the creation of novel forms of mass media, with a
parallel increase in protection for individual communicators.' 09
Rather than forestall the possible threat to existing culture from
technology, copyright law has greeted the advent of new media as a
welcome opportunity for advancement. It has come to regard ad-
ded protection for individual contributions as the surest means of
furthering such growth.
To adopt such a view in the adjudication of first amendment
claims concerning broadcasting speech would require a strict limi-
tation on regulations that now accommodate possibly unwilling lis-
teners. Regulators could no longer rely on a hierarchy of socially
valuable speech to justify purging the airwaves of purportedly in-
decent language. Instead, they would tailor their regulations so as
not to contravene the primary aim of preserving a forum for all
messages." 0 They would require only advance warnings to the pub-
107. The FCC identified, and the Court approved, four characteristics which warrant
distinctive treatment of broadcasting:
(1) children have access to radios and in many cases are unsupervised by par-
ents; (2) radio receivers are in the home, a place where people's privacy interest
is entitled to extra deference ... ; (3) unconsenting adults may tune in a station
without any warning that offensive language is being or will be broadcast; and
(4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the government must
therefore license in the public interest.
Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 97 (1975).
108. Under copyright law, the medium of expression is unimportant:
Under the bill it makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixa-
tion may be-whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any
other graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in writ-
ten, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable
form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any ma-
chine or device "now known or later developed."
HoUSE RePoRT,'supra note 5, at 52 (quoting the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)).
109. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976) ("Copyright protection sub-
sists ... in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.") (emphasis added).
110. As Justice Brennan said in dissent, the Pacifica decision "permits majoritarian
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lic, reflecting a balance weighted in favor of expression.'
Opposed to such an approach, the Court has stated that
"[e]ach method [of expression] tends to present its own peculiar
problems"11 to support limiting the reach of the first amendment,
most notably in the context of broadcasting. A concern for protect-
ing the public from receiving communications the Court ultimately
deems unwanted or undesirable has led the Court to approve a
broadcast regulatory scheme particularly sensitive to majoritarian
audience taste.
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation"s demonstrates the variable pro-
tection afforded speech in light of both the mode of its dissemina-
tion and its judicially assigned position in the hierarchy of speech
values. The Court applied a sliding scale to measure the pro-
tectability of broadcast language in order to insulate children from
indecent language and to protect unwilling adult listeners. Thus,
communication over the airwaves, given the sexual and excretory
connotations in this case, rendered such speech much lower in so-
cial value and, by corollary, subject to stricter governmental
control.
Such derogation of the significance of communications when
presented in the context of broadcasting, solely because of possible
intrusion into the privacy of the home, threatens the paramount
first amendment goal of wide dissemination of data. Indeed, in
light of this central concern, the Court should view broadcasting,
as well as other modern mass media, as an avenue for increasing
the possibilities of communication and, thereby, the generation
and exchange of values within society.
Society's essential interest in creativity is manifest in the ju-
dicial and legislative evolution of copyright doctrine. Over time,
copyright law has harnessed the cultural benefits of technological
advances by affording added protection to individual contributions
in those new forms. 14 In the doctrines of fair use, compulsory
license, and moral rights, copyright law has successfully balanced
conflicting interests to ensure both creativity and resultant
tastes completely to preclude a protected message from entering the homes of a receptive,
unoffended minority." 438 U.S. at 766 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. "[Hiaving elected to receive public air waves, the scanner who stumbles onto an
offensive program . . . can avert his attention by changing channels or turning off the set."
Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 26 (1977) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring), quoted in
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 765 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952).
113. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).




A few examples illustrate how past judicial derogation of con-
stitutional goals discouraged the values the Constitution intended
to foster, and how the legislature responded to restore the protec-
tion needed to ensure creativity. This historical pattern offers gui-
dance for first amendment analysis: attempts to accommodate val-
ues contrary to the constitutional mandate so suppress creative
incentive that they harm the public interest. In the same way that
encroaching on copyrights predictably discouraged the creativity
essential to progress in "Science and the useful Arts," current sub-
ordination of free expression to majoritarian skittishness will erode
the instrumental and personal goals of the first amendment. As
copyright law has adapted by recognizing the imperative to reward
and encourage creativity, the Court should similarly restore the
protection to which speech is entitled in the first amendment con-
text, to cultivate the enlightened society envisioned by the framers.
A. Fair Use
Accommodation of the public's right of access and the individ-
ual's right of protection is most evident in the doctrine of "fair
use." Under the doctrine, the public may reproduce or exploit
portions of copyrighted works-that is, abridge the copyright hold-
ers' entitlement to control dissemination of their works-without
infringing the copyrights. Out of deference to a creator, a fair use
defense rests on demonstrating that no negative impact on the
copyright owner or the work will result.115
To determine the validity of a fair use claim, the court exam-
ines the content of the copyrighted work and the context of its
communication.116 Such assessment, however, does not evaluate
115. In the recent case of Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 480 F. Supp. 429
(C.D. Cal. 1979), the district court found that off-the-air video taping for private, noncom-
mercial home enjoyment was a fair use. One of the factors the court looked to was that there
was no detrimental financial impact upon the copyright owners of the taped programs.
Judge Ferguson explicitly excluded from his holding a determination of whether either off-
the-air recording from cable or pay television, or taping for use outside the home, would
constitute an infringement. Id. at 433.
116. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a
fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
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the quality of the work, but rather determines whether its free use
by the public would harm the author economically or would de-
tract from the integrity of the work itself.
In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,1 7 the Court of
Claims found that mass photocopying of research periodicals by
the National Institute of Health and National Library of Medicine
was a fair use, and hence not an infringement of copyright. The
court placed a high value on medical research, and assumed that to
stop such library photocopying would "seriously hurt" it. The
court's emphasis on the social value of the use of the copyrighted
matter resulted, however, in its slighting the probable detrimental
effects that wholesale copying would have upon publishers of the
periodicals and ultimately, therefore, upon medical research
itself.11
In the year following the affirmance of Williams & Wilkins by
the Supreme Court, Congress enacted section 108 of the Copyright
Act of 1976. Section 108 has ameliorated the possible adverse ef-
fects of Williams & Wilkins by establishing guidelines for permis-
sible photocopying by libraries and archives.1 1 The guidelines per-
mit, but strictly limit, reproduction by noncommercial public or
research libraries, the type of user in Williams & Wilkins.
Through this innovation, the law has achieved the desired social
goal of encouraging noncommercial research, without sacrificing
the rewards to creativity called for by the Constitution.
righted work.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
117. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975).
118. The court required plaintiff publishers to prove economic harm, rather than sim-
ply demonstrate probable adverse impact. Recognition of the great difficulty that copyright
holders face in proving actual damages, however, has led Congress to enact a provision for
recovery of statutory damages when actual harm cannot be shown. See Copyright Act of
1976, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976). Thus, the insistence by the Court of Claims in Williams &
Wilkins that a copyright holder show actual damages in order to prevail on the threshold
issue of liability poses an obstacle that appears unwarranted in light of current copyright
purposes and supportive legislation. See Nimmer, Photocopying and Record Piracy: Of
Dred Scott and Alice in Wonderland, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1052 (1975).
One recently devised means of overcoming any detriment to publishers as a result of
the Williams & Wilkins decision is the Copyright Clearance Center. The Clearance Center
is a voluntary organization whose members' monthly payments enable them to photocopy
copyrighted material without requesting individual permissions. See ASSOCIATION OF AMERI-
CAN PUBLISHERS, INC. & AUTHORS LEAGUE, INC., PHOTOCOPYING BY ACADEMIC, PUBLIC AND
NONPROFIT RESEARCH LIBRARIES 39 (1978).
119. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1976). The congressionally authorized Na-
tional Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) has pro-




Compulsory licensing is a second method by which the law
balances copyrights and public use of the fruits of creativity. Like
the doctrine of fair use, the compulsory license is an attempt to
maintain incentives for creation while facilitating the free flow of
communication. Through this device, the public may use a copy-
righted work in derogation of the author's right to control its dis-
semination, but the user must pay the composer for such use and
must preserve the integrity of the composition itself.120 Compul-
sory licensing has been successful in such diverse areas of commu-
nication as juke box transmissions and cable television.
The effective use of compulsory licensing as an accommoda-
tion of both constitutional and short-range goals is evident in the
evolution of musical technology. In White-Smith Music Publishing
Co. v. Apollo,"' the Court narrowly construed the constitutional
term "writings" as not including perforated piano rolls. Because
the rolls were not visually perceptible, the Court found them to be
part of a mechanical process and not tangible manifestations of ex-
pression. The Court thus denied copyright status to music commu-
nicated in the form of pianola sheets. The Copyright Act of 1909
attempted to counteract this disincentive to creation, by codifying
a compulsory license provision for musical compositions.
122
Paralleling its initial approach towards piano rolls in the field
of musical creation, the Court held in Fortnightly Corp. v. United
Artists Television, Inc.,"' that cable systems do not infringe the
copyrights on programs that they retransmit. In a later case, the
Court applied the same reasoning and held that importation of dis-
tant signals into a new community by cable television did not in-
fringe upon the broadcasters' copyrights. 2 4
The intended purpose of these decisions was to promote devel-
opment of the incipient cable industry. But Justice Fortas's dissent
in Fortnightly,2 5 which criticized such slighting of copyright hold-
120. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) (1976); see HousE REPORT, supra note 5,
at 109. The statutory provision for compulsory licensure "is intended to recognize the prac-
tical need for a limited privilege to make arrangements of music being used under a compul-
sory license, but without allowing the music to be perverted, distorted, or travestied." Id.
121. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
122. The Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § l(e), 35 Stat. 1075, established a system of
compulsory licensing for the making and distribution of phonorecords of copyrighted music.
See also HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 52.
123. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
124. Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
125. 392 U.S. at 402 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
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ers, proved prophetic. Just as the White-Smith decision had hin-
dered the expansion of musical creativity, Fortnightly created dis-
incentives for broadcasters by reducing their protection in favor of
cable system companies. '26 Reduced protection discouraged broad-
casters and other producers from creating television programs that
they knew cable companies would use without remuneration. This
result, in turn, threatened to reduce the amount of programs avail-
able for cable, as well as for traditional broadcasting. To counter-
act this likelihood, the FCC exercised its ancillary jurisdiction over
cable to require that cable television transmitters first obtain the
consent of broadcasters before retransmitting the latter's pro-
grams. The result was disastrous: Broadcasters simply withheld
their consent.1 27
In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress has attempted to ame-
liorate the detriment to cultural growth in the same way it re-
sponded to the dilemma of unprotected pianola composers in the
Act of 1909. It has set up a compulsory licensing mechanism 28 that
automatically confers permission for program retransmission, while
requiring payment of compensation to all copyright holders of the
programs. This legislative accommodation of competing values si-
multaneously encourages continued generation of programs and
the development of cable systems.
C. Moral Rights
Clearly, copyright doctrine has attempted to accommodate
technological advancement in ways most sensitive to individual
contributions. So central is the significance of individual contribu-
tions that protection extends beyond assurance of financial remu-
neration to vindication of the authors' moral rights. Thus, an au-
thor has a right to assume that if another uses the copyrighted
work-whether through fair use or compulsory license or in some
other way-the user's treatment will preserve the original work's
integrity.
The recent case of Gilliam v. ABC, Inc.,12 9 illustrated judicial
protection of the primacy of artists' creativity by enforcing their
"moral rights." The Second Circuit held that broadcast of an un-
authorized, edited version of the Monty Python television program
126. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
127. Id.
128. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 111(d); HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 89-93.
129 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
1072 [Vol. 34:1043
A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
infringed the comedy group's copyright in the script. Although the
broadcaster had fully compensated the ensemble under a contract
for the broadcast, the integrity of their work was nevertheless
compromised:
Our resolution of these technical arguments serves to reinforce
our initial inclination that the copyright law should be used to
recognize the important role of the artist in our society and the
need to encourage production and dissemination of artistic
works by providing adequate legal protection for one who sub-
mits his work to the public. 8 0
D. Computer Programs
A current problem facing copyright doctrine is the need for a
means to protect expressions of individuals in computer forms,
while facilitating wide public access to these novel communica-
tions.1 38 1 Section 117 of the 1976 Act freezes copyrights in computer
programs and data bases to those existing before the effective date
of the Act.182 The Act leaves further resolution of the problem to
analysis and findings by the specially formed National Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU). In
its Final Report, the Commission has recommended that Congress
afford full copyright protection to computer programs, "to the ex-
tent that they embody an author's original creation."' 8
One CONTU Commissioner, novelist John Hersey, has ex-
pressed reservations regarding the conferring of copyright status
upon the final phases of a computer program. 34 Because those
phases are comprehensible only to machine parts, rather than to
the people who program computers, he would characterize them as
mechanical devices eligible only for patent protection. According to
Commissioner Hersey, granting permission to copyright such com-
puter phases would violate copyright's basic tenet: the protection
of human expression, which includes all tangible forms of interper-
sonal communication. He would reject the copyrightability of ma-
terial understandable to computers as a dangerous equation of
130. Id. at 23 (citations omitted). Based on a similar recognition of the role of the indi-
vidual creator, the Copyright Act of 1976 has increased markedly the protection afforded
copyright holders by, among many other provisions, lengthening the author's term of copy-
right and making renewal rights unabridgable.
131. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 116.
132. Id.
133. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OP COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CONTU FINAL REPORT].
134. Id. at 27 (Hersey, Comm'r, dissenting).
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human beings with machines. 35 Although superficially appealing,
on closer analysis Hersey's argument resembles the abandoned
White-Smith rule, which denied copyright status to perforated pi-
ano rolls on the ground that they were mechanical producers of
musical notes and not visually perceptible. The Commission prop-
erly rejected Commissioner Hersey's reasoning.
However well intentioned, the rules established in copyright
decisions that were designed to serve other goals at the expense of
encouraging creativity have indubitably failed. With the advent of
new communications media, such as photocopying and cable televi-
sion, the Supreme Court has denied or restricted authors' protec-
tion, to confer upon the public the immediate benefits of such ad-
vances. Rather than foster expansion of the media, however, these
decisions produced the opposite results. With no financial incen-
tive to individual creators and no protection of the fruits of their
imaginations and intellects, the growth of such media was inhib-
ited because there were fewer ideas to communicate. The makers
of copyright policy soon realized that they had substituted the
ephemeral benefits of short-range dissemination for much pre-
135. A computer program is a set of printed instructions that tells a computer how it
may solve a given problem. Generally, it consists of four phases: a flow chart, which indi-
cates the logical steps necessary for the solution; a source program, which translates the flow
chart into a computer language and is often punched on discs or cards; an assembly pro-
gram, which converts the programming language into mechanically readable computer lan-
guage; and the object program, which translates the machine language into further com-
mands of electrical impulses. Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063
(N.D. Il1. 1979). It is the assembly and object phases of the program that Commissioner
Hersey would exclude from copyright protection. In his view, it would be improper to confer
copyright status upon those aspects of a program that are capable of communicating
not with our fellow human beings, but with machines-thus equating machines
with human beings as the intended recipients of the distribution that copyright
was designed to foster. . . . A society that accepts in any degree such
equivalences of human beings and machines must become impoverished in the
long run in those aspects of the human spirit which can never be fully quantified
and which machines may be able in some distant future to linguistically "under-
stand" but will never be able to experience, never be able to bring to life, never
be able therefore to communicate. Those aspects include courage, love, integrity,
trust, the touch of flesh, the fire of intuition, the yearning and aspirations of
what poets so vaguely but so persistently call the soul-that bundle of qualities
we think of as being embraced by the word humanity. This concern is by no
means irrelevant to the issue of whether computer programs should be copy-
righted. It is the heart of the matter.
CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 133, at 37. Although Hersey sees the latter phases of the
computer program as noncopyrightable because they become part of the mechanical work-
ings of the computer itself, he nevertheless admits that "[a] data base, when keyed or run
into a computer, is being copied in this sense, for the data are maintained in the copy as
data, and they issue as data for human use in the end product." Id. at 32.
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ferred long-term communications development. Perceiving that the
key to cultural progress is the increased protection for individual
creativity, the law then readjusted the focal point of balance to
where the Constitution originally placed it: on the creator.
IV. CONCLUSION
To further the constitutional goal of free expression, the Su-
preme Court should heed the pattern established in copyright law.
To date, the Burger Court has reacted to modern communications
technology by lowering the standards for permissible abridgment
of speech. Its decisions ostensibly protect traditional privacy and
family interests, but inevitably restrict unconventional ideas
presented over broadcast or expansive communications media.
Such selective regulation necessarily inhibits the personal expres-
sion specifically guarded by the first amendment.
This comment has suggested that the Burger Court reexamine
its balancing methodology in its first amendment adjudication in
light of the broad significance attributed to the individual commu-
nicator in copyright theory. Read together, these two components
of the Constitution provide an opportunity, in our era of mass
technologies, to maximize contributions of individual intellect and
imagination, for in preserving "that inward eye/ Which is the bliss
of solitude, ' 6 we simultaneously ensure the creative potential of
all society.
136. W. WORDSWORTH, The Daffodils; or, I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud, in 3 THE
POETICAL WORKS OF WILLIAM WORDSWORTH 6, at 11. 21-22 (W. Knight ed. 1883).
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